Ted Kaufman's Friday Hearing Explains Everything That Is Broken With The US Financial System:

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 03/07/2011 22:10 -0500 Zero Hedge:

On Friday, free and efficient market champion Ted Kaufman, previously known for his stern crusade to rid the world of the HFT scourge, and all other market irregularities which unfortunately will stay with us until the next major market crash (and until the disbanding of the SEC following the terminal realization of its corrupt and utter worthlessness), held a hearing on the impact of the TARP on financial stability, no longer in his former position as a senator, but as Chairman of the Congressional TARP oversight panel.

Witness included Simon Johnson, Joseph Stiglitz, Allan Meltzer, William Nelson (Deputy Director of Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve), Damon Silvers (AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel), and others.

In typical Kaufman fashion, this no-nonsense hearing was one of the most informative and expository of all Wall Street evils to ever take place on the Hill. Which of course is why it received almost no coverage in the media.

Below we present a full transcript of the entire hearing, together with select highlights. The insights proffered by the panelists and the witnesses, while nothing new to those who have carefully followed the generational theft that has been occurring for two and a half years in plain view of everyone and shows no signs of stopping, are truly a must read for virtually every citizen of America and the world: this transcript explains in great detail what absolute crime is, and why it will likely forever go unpunished.

Read the full transcript here:

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/ted-kaufmans-friday-hearing-explains-everything-broken-us-financial-system

A Plea for Freedom:

http://www.infowars.com/a-plea-for-freedom/

THIS IS A MUST READ!!!...IMO

It's one of the best articles I've read all year...

America's Ten Most Corrupt Capitalists:

Wall Street's captains of industry and top policymakers in Washington are often the same people. A lot of them get rich by playing for both teams.

http://www.alternet.org/news/146819?page=entire

More Investigations on Wall Street:

Things are Heating Up for the Banks...Wall Street Probe Widens:

http://seekingalpha.com/article/204854-more-investigations-on-wall-street?source=yahoo

by Susan Pulliam, Kara Scannell, Aaron Lucchetti, and Serena Ng,WSJ:

Federal prosecutors, working with securities regulators, are conducting a preliminary criminal probe into whether several major Wall Street banks misled investors about their roles in mortgage-bond deals, according to a person familiar with the matter.

The banks under early-stage criminal scrutiny—J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG and UBS AG—have also received civil subpoenas from the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of a sweeping investigation of banks' selling and trading of mortgage-related deals... Under similar preliminary criminal scrutiny are Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, as previously reported by The Wall Street Journal. ...

At issue is whether the Wall Street firms made proper representations to investors in marketing, selling and trading pools of mortgage bonds called collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. ...

Prosecutors so far are simply gathering evidence. ... It's possible the probe could end with no charges being brought against any of the firms. ...

And:

Prosecutors Ask if 8 Banks Duped Rating Agencies, by Louise Story, NY Times:

The New York attorney general has started an investigation of eight banks to determine whether they provided misleading information to rating agencies in order to inflate the grades of certain mortgage securities...

The investigation parallels federal inquiries into ... interactions between the banks and their clients who bought mortgage securities, this one expands the scope of scrutiny to the interplay between banks and the agencies that rate their securities. ... The inquiry ... suggests that ... the agencies may have been duped by one or more of ... Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Crédit Agricole and Merrill Lynch...

The companies that rated the mortgage deals are Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service. ... Mr. Cuomo’s investigation follows an article in The New York Times that described some of the techniques bankers used to get more positive evaluations from the rating agencies.

Mr. Cuomo is ... interested in the revolving door of employees of the rating agencies who were hired by bank mortgage desks to help create mortgage deals that got better ratings than they deserved... His ... focus is on information the investment banks provided to the rating agencies and whether the bankers knew the ratings were overly positive...

Edmund Andrews says financial reform legislation is not yet a done deal, and could still be watered down to appease banking interests:

Financial overhaul, perils ahead, by Edmund L. Andrews:

It’s tempting to think that financial regulatory reform is already a done deal in Congress... Don’t be fooled. It’s true that the Senate is likely to pass some kind of bill. Unfortunately, the legislation is still at risk of death by a thousand cuts: scores of seemingly anodyne amendments that, if passed, turn the bill into a cynical joke.

You know the drill..., some people – on Wall Street, or at the banks -- want to spare us from “unintended consequences.”

Today, Senate Democrats managed to vote down a major Republican push to gut portions of the bill to regulate derivatives, like the credit-default swaps that blew apart AIG. ...

Tomorrow, Republican Sam Brownback will push an amendment to exclude car dealers from oversight by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. ...

But I would like to focus on a third imminent that seems drier than derivatives or car loans but is at least as important: federal pre-emption of state financial regulations. And this time, it's moderate Dems who are carrying water for the banks.

In the run-up to the mortgage meltdown, federal bank regulators fought hard to pre-empt any state efforts to crack down on shady bank practices. A number of states, like North Carolina and New York, were trying to crack down on abusive mortgage practices by subprime lenders. But many of the lenders were subsidiaries of national banks, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency declared that states had no right to touch them whatsoever. ...

The amendment to watch out for in the days ahead actually comes from a Democrat: Tom Carper of Delaware. Carper’s amendment would forbid state attorney generals from prosecuting banks that violate national consumer laws, much as the fed’s blocked Elliott Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo of New York from investigating racial and ethnic targeting by subprime lenders. It would also allow the Feds to override state consumer laws...

Don’t let it happen.

The bill needs to be made stronger, not weaker, so let's hope that amendments to water down the bill's impact continue to lack the necessary support.

On a broader note, there seems to be a shift in the narrative about what caused the crisis. Fraud, deception, and other questionable if not illegal behaviors are beginning to take on a larger role in the story of what happened to bring about the problems in the financial sector. The turning point was, of course, the investigation of Goldman (GS), and the investigations have been growing more numerous ever since.

The shift in attitude has probably helped to stave off challenges designed to weaken the legislation, and if a smoking gun turns up in one of the investigations like those described above, that would likely make it even harder for banks get the political support needed to water down the legislation. But I'm not counting on that happening, and as noted above, the deal isn't done yet. It's still possible for the legislation to be weakened, and as pointed out above there's no shortage of attempts to do just that.

Did a Big Universa Hedge Fund Bet Help Trigger 'Black Swan' Stock Swoon?

By Scott Patterson And Tom Lauricella

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704879704575236771699461084.html

Shortly after 2:15 p.m. Eastern time on Thursday, hedge fund Universa Investments LP placed a big bet in the Chicago options trading pits that stocks would continue their sharp declines.

On any other day, this $7.5 million trade for 50,000 options contracts might have briefly hurt stock prices, though not caused much of a ripple. But coming on a day when all varieties of financial markets were deeply unsettled, the trade may have played a key role in the stock-market collapse just 20 minutes later.

The trade by Universa, a hedge fund advised by Nassim Taleb, author of "Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable," led traders on the other side of the transaction—including Barclays Capital, the brokerage arm of British bank Barclays PLC—to do their own selling to offset some of the risk, according to traders in Chicago.

Then, as the market fell, those declines are likely to have forced even more "hedging" sales, creating a tsunami of pressure that spread to nearly all parts of the market.

The tidal wave of selling fed into a market already on edge about the economy in Europe. As the selling spread, a blast of orders appears to have jarred the flow of data going into brokerage firms, such as Barclays Capital, according to people familiar with the matter.

Exchanges, in turn, were clogged by huge volumes of offers to buy and sell stocks, say traders and exchange executives. Even before some individual stocks collapsed to just a penny a share, data from the NYSE Euronext's electronic Arca exchange started to appear questionable, say traders.

In the disarray, some huge superfast-trading hedge funds that now provide much of the liquidity for the stock market pulled to the sidelines. The working theory among traders and others involved in the exchange meltdown is that the "Black Swan"-linked fund may have contributed to a "Black Swan" moment, a rare, unforeseen event that can have devastating consequences.

"Universa alone couldn't have caused the meltdown," said Mark Spitznagel, Universa's founder. "We had reached a critical point in the market, and it was poised to collapse." Barclays Capital declined to comment.

As more details of Thursday's collapse become clear, there is less evidence to suggest a "fat finger" data-entry error caused the collapse. Instead, the picture is one of a rare confluence of events, some linked, some unrelated, that exposed weaknesses in the stock market large and small. Within five minutes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had lost 700 points as trading seized up in individual stocks such as Procter & Gamble and even exchange-traded mutual funds.

"It did point out that there is a structural flaw," said Gus Sauter, chief investment officer at Vanguard Group. "We have to think through how you preserve the immediacy and yet preserve the liquidity."

The episode highlights a bigger question about the stock market. In recent years, the market has grown exponentially faster and more diverse. Stock trading's main venue is no longer the New York Stock Exchange but rather computer servers run by companies as far afield as Austin, Texas; Kansas City, Mo.; and Red Bank, N.J.

This diversity has made stock-trading cheaper, a plus for both institutional and individual investors. It has also made it more unruly and difficult to ensure an orderly market. Today that responsibility falls largely on a group of high-frequency traders who make up an estimated two-thirds of stock-market volume. These for-profit hedge funds look out for their own investors' interests and not those of investors in the stocks they trade.

Hours before the panic began, there were signs that Thursday wasn't shaping up to be a humdrum day. By 11 a.m., when the Dow was down only about 60 points, selling volume was unusually heavy. One measure of selling—the percentage of stocks falling without first moving upward—was at its highest since the day the market reopened after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, according to Barclays.

By 2 p.m., financial markets of just about every sort were under significant strain. In Europe, the spillover from the Greek debt crisis led to a huge drop in the euro against the dollar and the Japanese yen, as well as a broad bond-market decline. European banks were charging each other higher interest rates to borrow money.

Some 2,800 miles away from Wall Street, in Santa Monica, Calif., Universa placed its trade.

The trade wasn't out of character for Universa, which has about $6 billion under management. Mr. Taleb, who is an adviser to the firm and an investor, gained fame for "The Black Swan," a book that suggested unlikely events in the financial markets are far more likely than most investors believe.

Universa frequently purchases options contracts that will pay off if the market makes a sharp move lower. It posted big gains in the market selloff of late 2008 and launched a fund last year designed to benefit if inflation surges.

Through the trading desks at Barclays, Universa bought 50,000 options contracts, according to people familiar with the matter. The contracts would pay off about $4 billion should the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index fall to 800 in June. It was at 1145 points at the time of the trade.

Back across the country in Chicago, the big trade appeared to have had an immediate ripple in the markets. The traders on the other side of the Universa trade were essentially betting stocks wouldn't post big losses.

But to minimize the risk of losing money, they in turn needed to sell, according to traders.

The more the market fell, the more the traders at places like Barclays had to sell to protect their own positions. This, along with likely dozens of other trades across the market, led to a cascade of selling in the futures markets.

As the stock-trading volume soared, data systems across the stock market began to get clogged. At Barclays Capital, a market data feed that delivers to the firm data on "buy" and "sell" orders went down, although a backup system immediately went online without any impact to the firm.

As the turmoil unfolded, every second saw some 300,000 pieces of stock information—stock prices moves, trades—pour into Barclays's system. A normal peak is some 60,000 ticks a second, says Barclays Capital's head of electronic trading sales, Brian Fagen, who was monitoring the chaos in the market on his screens.

Large hedge funds were juggling huge positions as volume spiked. Two Sigma Investments LLC, a New York hedge-fund manager that engages in complex trading strategies, saw its highest-volume day since launching in 2001, according to a person familiar with the matter.

By 2:37 p.m., the overload seemed to have taken its toll on the NYSE's Arca electronic-trading system. At that point, its rival, the Nasdaq, owned by Nasdaq OMX Group Inc., detected what it felt was questionable information in the data. It sent out a message saying it would no longer route quotes to Arca.

This step, known as declaring "self help," doesn't happen often among the major exchanges. But in the coming minutes, the BATS exchange also stopped automatically routing orders to Arca.

For a crucial set of players—high-frequency-trading hedge funds—all this turmoil was becoming too risky to handle. One fear that would prove all too real was that in the extreme swings, some, but not all, trades would later be canceled, leaving them on the hook for unwanted positions.

Manoj Narang, whose Tradeworx Inc. firm runs a high-frequency trading operation in Red Bank, N.J., began to worry the extreme volatility could lead to painful losses in his fund.

At about 2:40, he and a small team of traders scrambled to close the positions held by the high-speed fund, which trades rapidly between stock indexes and the individual stocks in the index.

Normally, it takes about a fraction of a second to unwind the trades because of the high-powered computers Mr. Narang uses. But as the market plunged, it took about two minutes—an eternity in today's computer-driven market. Tradebot Systems Inc, a large high-frequency firm based in Kansas City, Mo., was also seeing chaotic action in many of the securities it traded and decided to pull back from the market.

With the high-frequency funds either selling or pulling out of the market, Wall Street brokerage firms pulling back and the NYSE temporarily halting trading on some stocks, offers to buy stocks vanished from underneath the market. Normally there can be hundreds of offers to buy the iShares Russell 1000 Growth Index exchange-traded fund, but at 2:46 p.m., there were just four bids north of $14 for a fund that had been trading at $51 minutes earlier, according to data reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Around 3 p.m., the selling pressure abated. Just as swiftly as the market fell, it recovered ground. One factor behind the swift recovery, traders say, were funds that use computers and formulas to sniff out bargains in the market. These funds swooped in on hundreds of cheap stocks, helping push the market higher.

High Frequency Terrorism: How the Big Banks and Federal Reserve Maintained Their Death Grip Over the United States:

By David DeGraw & Max Keiser, AmpedStatus Report
Posted on Monday, May 10th, 2010 at 1:11 am

http://ampedstatus.com/high-frequency-terrorism-how-the-big-banks-and-federal-reserve-maintained-their-death-grip-over-the-united-states

The following article is the third-part of a six-part report titled: “The Financial Oligarchy Reigns: Democracy’s Death Spiral From Greece to the United States.” The full report is available here:

http://ampedstatus.com/the-financial-oligarchy-reigns-democracys-death-spiral-from-greece-to-the-united-states

III: Financial Terrorism Operations: 9/29/08 & 5/6/10

In the aftermath of Goldman Sachs’ public flogging before the world in Congress, and while under investigation, on the very day that Congress was voting on the “break up the too big to fail banks” amendment and cutting behind the scenes deals to gut the audit of the Federal Reserve, the stock market had its greatest sudden drop in history, plummeting 700 points in ten minutes - shades of September 29, 2008 all over again.

If you recall, back in September ‘08, as Congress was voting down the first bailout, the big banks made the market plunge a record 778 points in one day, fear and panic then led Congress to pass the bailout. Trillions of our tax dollars, the money that we desperately need to keep our society functioning over the long run, then went out the window and into the pockets of the very people who caused the crash.

What happened on September 29, 2008 will go down in history as one of the greatest acts of terrorism ever.

9/29/08 proved that when you have so much power concentrated in the hands of a few, you can manipulate a computer algorithm and make the market and economy go which ever way you want it to go. So on 5/6/10, just as the power of the big banks was threatened again on the floor of the Senate and a deal on auditing the Federal Reserve was being negotiated, in came a sudden and unprecedented ten-minute 700 point market drop. A precision-guided High Frequency Trading (HFT) attack to show Congress who’s boss.

If you think the massive sudden drop happened because one lowly trader hit one wrong button, if you actually believe that the entire stock market can plunge because of one mistaken key stroke by a low level trader, you are stunningly naïve. I hate to burst your bubble, but this was a direct attack.

In a market where 70% of all trades are executed by computer algorithms via High Frequency Trading (HFT), Goldman Sachs has the power to make the market crash or rise at will. In fact, Goldman has a major Weapon of Mass Destruction in its Program Trading monopoly of the New York Stock Exchange, as Tyler Durden described on Zero Hedge:

“Goldman’s dominance of the NYSE’s Program Trading platform, where in addition to recent entrant GETCO, it has been to date an explicit monopolist of the so-called Supplementary Liquidity Provider program, a role which affords the company greater liquidity rebates for, well providing liquidity, and generating who knows what other possible front market-looking, flow-prop integration benefits. Yesterday [5/6/10], Goldman’s SLP function was non-existent. One wonders - was the Goldman SLP team in fact liquidity taking, or to put it bluntly, among the main reasons for the market collapse….

… here is the most recently disclosed NYSE program trading data….

What is notable here is that of the 1.4 billion in principal shares, or shares traded for the firm’s own account, Goldman was the top trader by a margin of over 100% compared to the second biggest program trader.

We have long claimed that Goldman is the de facto monopolist of the NYSE’s program trading platform. As such, it is certainly the case that Goldman was instrumental in either a) precipitating yesterday’s crash or b) not providing the critical liquidity which it is required to do, when the time came. There are no other options.”

For further investigation, I turned to Max Keiser, who has written and authored similar Program Trading and HFT computer algorithms. I asked him if he thought this was an attack, here is what he had to say:

“May 6th was an unequivocal act of domestic financial terrorism in America. A day that will live in infamy.

To scare the lawmakers, themselves large owners of the very banks and stocks that they are supposed to be regulating, a financial Weapon of Mass Destruction was put to their head and they acquiesced.

As the inventor of the continuous double-auction, market-making technology (VST tech. US pat. no. 5950176) that is referenced 132 times by program trading and HFT patents since 1996, I can tell you that Goldman, JP Morgan and the gang simply pulled the ‘buys’ from their computer trading programs and manufactured a crash. And when the coast was clear, and it was clear the politicians were not going to vote for anything that would break up the ‘too big to fail’ banks; all the ’sells’ were pulled from the computers and the market roared back.

This is a Manchurian Candidate market where program trading bots start the ball rolling in whatever direction Wall St. wants the market to go - and then hundreds of thousands of day-traders watching Cramer on CNBC jump on the momentum bandwagon and commit the crime for the Wall St. financial terrorists, who then say, ‘It wasn’t us, it was ‘the market!’”

On Friday, the next day, after the “break up the too big to fail banks” amendment was soundly defeated by a 61 to 33 margin in Senate and a deal was struck to eliminate key provisions from the audit of the Federal Reserve bill, Goldman was meeting with the SEC to work out a settlement in their case against them. Once again, Goldman proves that crime pays. Welcome to the New Mafia World Order.

Other than the two major operations carried out on 9/29/08 and 5/6/10, we must also recall a smaller attack on January 21st and 22nd of 2010, when Obama had a press conference and came out in favor of the Volcker Rule, which would have limited these HFT and “proprietary trading” schemes. At that time, the market dropped 430 points. Soon after this attack, all follow up talk on the Volcker Rule faded away and this reform has not been seriously addressed by Obama since then.

The bottom line, the United States has been taken over by a financial terrorism network. Let’s face it, we are all hostages of these financial terrorists and our puppet politicians rather be in on the scam than defend our interests. If these terrorists don’t get their way at all times, they have the power to throw their tremendous weight around and turn millions of lives upside down in a matter of minutes, and as they have shown they have no hesitation in executing that power, no matter how many millions of lives they destroy.

They set off this crisis with a wave of bombings in their initial Economic Shock and Awe campaign two years ago, resulting in massive devastation. Just to name a few of their greatest hits within the U.S.:

* 50 million Americans are now living in poverty, which is the highest poverty rate in the industrialized world;

* 30 million Americans are in need of work;

* Five million American families foreclosed upon, 15 million expected by 2014;

* 50% of US children will now use a food stamp during childhood;

* Soaring budget deficits in states across the country and a record high national debt, with austerity measures on the way;

* Record-breaking profits and bonuses for themselves.

Like other terrorists, they don’t use IEDs, they use CDOs. They don’t use precision laser-guided missiles, they use High Frequency Trading. They don’t have WMDs, they have derivatives. Let’s also not forget that they have toxic assets and dirty debt bombs just waiting to be deployed upon the American public once there is any true growth in the economy. Their nuclear arsenal includes hundreds of Trillions in secretive derivatives and hidden debt bombs, just ticking away, waiting to be set off… at their whim...

$GS - The Death of Goldman Sachs:

Steven G. Brant
Posted: April 27, 2010 06:58 PM

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-g-brant/the-death-of-goldman-sach_b_554371.html

I saw something die today. It didn't die accidentally either. It was killed.

This was a very painful event to watch, not just because death is tragic and not because this death was intentional rather than accidental.

It was very painful to watch because the thing being killed didn't even know it was dying... and it didn't know it was actually participating in its own death. It didn't know it was helping the hangman not just put the noose around its neck but helping the hangman open the trap door under its feet.

What died today was Goldman Sachs. It has existed for 140 years. But today all that ended, as the head of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein, in his prepared remarks before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations, said "We have been a client-centered firm for 140 years and if our clients believe that we don't deserve their trust, we cannot survive."

That was Lloyd Blankfein putting the noose around Goldman Sachs' neck.

And then - in his opening exchange with Subcommittee chair Senator Carl Levin - Lloyd Blankfein proved that Goldman Sachs absolutely, positively does not deserve the trust of its clients.

That was Lloyd Blankfein helping open the door under Goldman Sachs' feet.

In his Senate appearance, Lloyd Blankfein participated in the death of his own company. It was really a stunning thing to watch.

I expect Goldman Sachs to be out of business by the end of this year and maybe before the November election. That's just my opinion, of course. But I'll justify it in a moment.

I will post C-Span's coverage of this testimony as soon as it's available. I predict it will be viewed for years to come by students of business ethics but also by students of famous moments in the civic life of America. I believe this moment will be seen on par with the famous incident in which Senator McCarthy was brought down with the simple question "Have you no sense of decency?"

Senator Carl Levin's simple question - the one that killed Goldman Sachs - was "Do you think it's proper for Goldman Sachs to bet against the security it is selling to a client without telling that client that it is making that bet?"

(I will check the transcript later, to make sure I have the wording of this question correct.)

Mr. Blankfein said over and over again that it was proper for Goldman Sachs to do what they had done. He even said at one point that the minute Goldman Sachs sells something to its customer, it no longer owns that security and has "the opposite interest" to its client regarding that security. This was just one of many breathtaking moments, as I could tell that Mr. Blankfein had no idea what he was doing to his firm.

In late 2001, the collapse of ENRON led to the death of the legendary accounting firm Arthur Andersen.

Arthur Anderson's reputation was unmatched in the field; but, in 2002, Arthur Andersen was found guilty of criminal charges related to its auditing of ENRON and gave up its license to practice accounting.

Criminal behavior. No trust. Reputation destroyed. No customers. Firm dead

Welcome to the Arthur Andersen reality, Goldman Sachs.

Civil charges of fraud brought, and there may be more coming. No trust. Reputation destroyed. No customers. Firm dead.

What a fascinating time we are living in. If things really do play out the way they did with ENRON and Arthur Andersen - and I think they will - I guess we'll be able to say that there is such a thing as white-collar justice in America.

Lloyd Blankfein's testimony is now available on C-Span's video page.

http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293196-3

Matt Taibbi: The Lunatics Who Made a Religion Out of Greed and Wrecked the Economy:

The SEC's lawsuit against Goldman Sachs is a chance to prevent greed without limits...

http://www.alternet.org/story/146611/taibbi:_the_lunatics_who_made_a_religion_out_of_greed_and_wrecked_the_economy__?page=entire



April 26, 2010

So Goldman Sachs, the world's greatest and smuggest investment bank, has been sued for fraud by the American Securities and Exchange Commission. Legally, the case hangs on a technicality.

Morally, however, the Goldman Sachs case may turn into a final referendum on the greed-is-good ethos that conquered America sometime in the 80s – and in the years since has aped other horrifying American trends such as boybands and reality shows in spreading across the western world like a venereal disease.

When Britain and other countries were engulfed in the flood of defaults and derivative losses that emerged from the collapse of the American housing bubble two years ago, few people understood that the crash had its roots in the lunatic greed-centered objectivist religion, fostered back in the 50s and 60s by ponderous emigre novelist Ayn Rand.

While, outside of America, Russian-born Rand is probably best known for being the unfunniest person western civilisation has seen since maybe Goebbels or Jack the Ripper (63 out of 100 colobus monkeys recently forced to read Atlas Shrugged in a laboratory setting died of boredom-induced aneurysms), in America Rand is upheld as an intellectual giant of limitless wisdom. Here in the States, her ideas are roundly worshipped even by people who've never read her books or even heard of her. The rightwing "Tea Party" movement is just one example of an entire demographic that has been inspired to mass protest by Rand without even knowing it.

Last summer I wrote a brutally negative article about Goldman Sachs for Rolling Stone magazine (I called the bank a "great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity") that unexpectedly sparked a heated national debate. On one side of the debate were people like me, who believed that Goldman is little better than a criminal enterprise that earns its billions by bilking the market, the government, and even its own clients in a bewildering variety of complex financial scams.

On the other side of the debate were the people who argued Goldman wasn't guilty of anything except being "too smart" and really, really good at making money. This side of the argument was based almost entirely on the Randian belief system, under which the leaders of Goldman Sachs appear not as the cheap swindlers they look like to me, but idealized heroes, the saviors of society.

In the Randian ethos, called objectivism, the only real morality is self-interest, and society is divided into groups who are efficiently self-interested (ie, the rich) and the "parasites" and "moochers" who wish to take their earnings through taxes, which are an unjust use of force in Randian politics. Rand believed government had virtually no natural role in society. She conceded that police were necessary, but was such a fervent believer in laissez-faire capitalism she refused to accept any need for economic regulation – which is a fancy way of saying we only need law enforcement for unsophisticated criminals.

Rand's fingerprints are all over the recent Goldman story. The case in question involves a hedge fund financier, John Paulson, who went to Goldman with the idea of a synthetic derivative package pegged to risky American mortgages, for use in betting against the mortgage market. Paulson would short the package, called Abacus, and Goldman would then sell the deal to suckers who would be told it was a good bet for a long investment. The SEC's contention is that Goldman committed a crime – a "failure to disclose" – when they failed to tell the suckers about the role played by the vulture betting against them on the other side of the deal.

Now, the instruments in question in this deal – collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps – fall into the category of derivatives, which are virtually unregulated in the US thanks in large part to the effort of gremlinish former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, who as a young man was close to Rand and remained a staunch Randian his whole life. In the late 90s, Greenspan lobbied hard for the passage of a law that came to be called the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act of 2000, a monster of a bill that among other things deregulated the sort of interest-rate swaps Goldman used in its now-infamous dealings with Greece.

Both the Paulson deal and the Greece deal were examples of Goldman making millions by bending over their own business partners. In the Paulson deal the suckers were European banks such as ABN-Amro and IKB, which were never told that the stuff Goldman was cheerfully selling to them was, in effect, designed to implode; in the Greece deal, Goldman hilariously used exotic swaps to help the country mask its financial problems, then turned right around and bet against the country by shorting Greece's debt.

Now here's the really weird thing. Confronted with the evidence of public outrage over these deals, the leaders of Goldman will often appear to be genuinely confused, scratching their heads and staring quizzically into the camera like they don't know what you're upset about. It's not an act. There have been a lot of greedy financiers and banks in history, but what makes Goldman stand out is its truly bizarre cultist/religious belief in the rightness of what it does.

The point was driven home in England last year, when Goldman's international adviser, sounding exactly like a character in Atlas Shrugged, told an audience at St Paul's Cathedral that "The injunction of Jesus to love others as ourselves is an endorsement of self-interest". A few weeks later, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein told the Times that he was doing "God's work".

Even if he stands to make a buck at it, even your average used-car salesman won't sell some working father a car with wobbly brakes, then buy life insurance policies on that customer and his kids. But this is done almost as a matter of routine in the financial services industry, where the attitude after the inevitable pileup would be that that family was dumb for getting into the car in the first place. Caveat emptor, dude!

People have to understand this Randian mindset is now ingrained in the American character. You have to live here to see it. There's a hatred toward "moochers" and "parasites" – the Tea Party movement, which is mainly a bunch of pissed off suburban white people whining about minorities consuming social services, describes the battle as being between "water-carriers" and "water-drinkers". And regulation of any kind is deeply resisted, even after a disaster as sweeping as the 2008 crash.

This debate is going to be crystallised in the Goldman case. Much of America is going to reflexively insist that Goldman's only crime was being smarter and better at making money than IKB and ABN-Amro, and that the intrusive, meddling government (in the American narrative, always the bad guy!) should get off Goldman's Armani-clad back. Another side is going to argue that Goldman winning this case would be a rebuke to the whole idea of civilisation – which, after all, is really just a collective decision by all of us not to screw each other over even when we can. It's an important moment in the history of modern global capitalism: whether or not to move forward into a world of greed without limits.

Computerized Front Running: How A Computer Program Designed to Save the Free Market Turned Into a MONSTER!:

Ellen Brown,
April 22nd, 2010

http://www.webofdebt.com/articles/computerized_front_running.php

While the SEC is busy investigating Goldman Sachs, it might want to look into another Goldman-dominated fraud: computerized front running using high-frequency trading programs.

Market commentators are fond of talking about “free market capitalism,” but according to Wall Street commentator Max Keiser, it is no more. It has morphed into what his TV co-host Stacy Herbert calls “rigged market capitalism”: all markets today are subject to manipulation for private gain.

Keiser isn’t just speculating about this. He claims to have invented one of the most widely used programs for doing the rigging. Not that that’s what he meant to invent. His patented program was designed to take the manipulation out of markets. It would do this by matching buyers with sellers automatically, eliminating “front running” – brokers buying or selling ahead of large orders coming in from their clients. The computer program was intended to remove the conflict of interest that exists when brokers who match buyers with sellers are also selling from their own accounts. But the program fell into the wrong hands and became the prototype for automated trading programs that actually facilitate front running.

Also called High Frequency Trading (HFT) or “black box trading,” automated program trading uses high-speed computers governed by complex algorithms (instructions to the computer) to analyze data and transact orders in massive quantities at very high speeds. Like the poker player peeking in a mirror to see his opponent’s cards, HFT allows the program trader to peek at major incoming orders and jump in front of them to skim profits off the top. And these large institutional orders are our money -- our pension funds, mutual funds, and 401Ks.

When “market making” (matching buyers with sellers) was done strictly by human brokers on the floor of the stock exchange, manipulations and front running were considered an acceptable (if morally dubious) price to pay for continuously “liquid” markets. But front running by computer, using complex trading programs, is an entirely different species of fraud. A minor flaw in the system has morphed into a monster. Keiser maintains that computerized front running with HFT has become the principal business of Wall Street and the primary force driving most of the volume on exchanges, contributing not only to a large portion of trading profits but to the manipulation of markets for economic and political ends.

The “Virtual Specialist”: the Prototype for High Frequency Trading:

Until recently, most market making was done by brokers called “specialists,” those people you see on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange haggling over the price of stocks. The job of the specialist originated over a century ago, when the need was recognized for a system for continuous trading. That meant trading even when there was no “real” buyer or seller waiting to take the other side of the trade.

The specialist is a broker who deals in a specific stock and remains at one location on the floor holding an inventory of it. He posts the “bid” and “ask” prices, manages “limit” orders, executes trades, and is responsible for managing the uninterrupted flow of orders. If there is a large shift in demand on the “buy” side or the “sell” side, the specialist steps in and sells or buys out of his own inventory to meet the demand, until the gap has narrowed.

This gives him an opportunity to trade for himself, using his inside knowledge to book a profit. That practice is frowned on by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), but it has never been seriously regulated, because it has been considered necessary to keep markets “liquid.”

Keiser’s “Virtual Specialist Technology” (VST) was developed for the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), a web-based, multiplayer simulation in which players use virtual money to buy and sell “shares” of actors, directors, upcoming films, and film-related options. The program determines the true market price automatically, by comparing “bids” with “asks” and weighting the proportion of each. Keiser and HSX co-founder Michael Burns applied for a patent for a “computer-implemented securities trading system with a virtual specialist function” in 1996, and U.S. patent no. 5960176 was awarded in 1999.

But things went awry after the dot.com crash, when Keiser’s company HSX Holdings sold the VST patent to investment firm Cantor Fitzgerald, over his objection. Cantor Fitzgerald then put the part of the program that would have eliminated front-running on ice, just as drug companies buy up competing patents in order to take them off the market. Instead of preventing front-running, the program was altered so that it actually enhanced that fraudulent practice. Keiser (who is now based in Europe) notes that this sort of patent abuse is illegal under European Intellectual Property law.

Meanwhile, the design of the VST program remained on display at the patent office, giving other inventors ideas. To get a patent, applicants must list “prior art” and then prove that their patent is an improvement in some way. The listing for Keiser’s patent shows that it has been referenced by 132 others involving automated program trading or HFT.

Since then, HFT has quickly come to dominate the exchanges. High frequency trading firms now account for 73% of all U.S. equity trades, although they represent only 2% of the approximately 20,000 firms in operation.

In 1998, the SEC allowed online electronic communication networks, or alternative trading systems, to become full-fledged stock exchanges. Alternative trading systems (ATS) are computer-automated order-matching systems that offer exchange-like trading opportunities at lower costs but are often subject to lower disclosure requirements and different trading rules. Computer systems automatically match buy and sell orders that were themselves submitted through computers. Market making that was once done with a “specialist’s book” -- something that could be examined and audited -- is now done by an unseen, unaudited “black box.”

For over a century, the stock market was a real market, with live traders hotly bidding against each other on the floor of the exchange. In only a decade, floor trading has been eliminated in all but the largest exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); and even in those markets, it now co-exists with electronic trading.

Alternative trading systems allow just about any sizable trader to place orders directly in the market, rather than routing them through investment dealers on the NYSE. They also allow any sizable trader with a sophisticated HFT program to front run trades.

Flash Trades: How the Game Is Rigged:

An integral component of computerized front running is a dubious practice called “flash trades.” Flash orders are permitted by a regulatory loophole that allows exchanges to show orders to some traders ahead of others for a fee. At one time, the NYSE allowed specialists to benefit from an advance look at incoming orders; but it has now replaced that practice with a “level playing field” policy that gives all investors equal access to all price quotes. Some ATSs, however, which are hotly competing with the established exchanges for business, have adopted the use of flash trades to pull trading business away from the exchanges. An incoming order is revealed (or flashed) to a trader for a fraction of a second before being sent to the national market system. If the trader can match the best bid or offer in the system, he can then pick up that order before the rest of the market sees it.

The flash peek reveals the trade coming in but not the limit price – the maximum price at which the buyer or seller is willing to trade. This is what the HFT program figures out, and it is what gives the high-frequency trader the same sort of inside information available to the traditional market maker: he now gets to peek at the other player’s cards. That means high-frequency traders can do more than just skim hefty profits from other investors. They can actually manipulate markets.

How this is done was explained by Karl Denninger in an insightful post on Seeking Alpha in July 2009:

“Let’s say that there is a buyer willing to buy 100,000 shares of BRCM with a limit price of $26.40. That is, the buyer will accept any price up to $26.40. But the market at this particular moment in time is at $26.10, or thirty cents lower.

“So the computers, having detected via their ‘flash orders’ (which ought to be illegal) that there is a desire for Broadcom shares, start to issue tiny (typically 100 share lots) ‘immediate or cancel’ orders - IOCs - to sell at $26.20. If that order is ‘eaten’ the computer then issues an order at $26.25, then $26.30, then $26.35, then $26.40. When it tries $26.45 it gets no bite and the order is immediately canceled.

“Now the flush of supply comes at, big coincidence, $26.39, and the claim is made that the market has become ‘more efficient.’

“Nonsense; there was no ‘real seller’ at any of these prices! This pattern of offering was intended to do one and only one thing -- manipulate the market by discovering what is supposed to be a hidden piece of information -- the other side’s limit price!

“With normal order queues and flows the person with the limit order would see the offer at $26.20 and might drop his limit. But the computers are so fast that unless you own one of the same speed you have no chance to do this -- your order is immediately ‘raped’ at the full limit price! . . . [Y]ou got screwed for 29 cents per share which was quite literally stolen by the HFT firms that probed your book before you could detect the activity, determined your maximum price, and then sold to you as close to your maximum price as was possible.”

The ostensible justification for high-frequency programs is that they “improve liquidity,” but Denninger says, “Hogwash. They have turned the market into a rigged game where institutional orders (that’s you, Mr. and Mrs. Joe Public, when you buy or sell mutual funds!) are routinely screwed for the benefit of a few major international banks.”

In fact, high-frequency traders may be removing liquidity from the market. So argues John Daly in the U.K. Globe and Mail, citing Thomas Caldwell, CEO of Caldwell Securities Ltd.:

“Large institutional investors know that if they start trying to push through a large block of shares at a certain price – even if the block is broken into many small trades on several ATSs and markets -- they can trigger a flood of high-frequency orders that immediately move market prices to the institution’s disadvantage. . . . That’s why institutions have flocked to so-called dark pools operated by ATSs such as Instinet, and individual dealers like Goldman Sachs. The pools allow traders to offer prices without publicly revealing their identities and tipping their hand.”

Because these large, dark pools are opaque to other investors and to regulators, they inhibit the free and fair trade that depends on open and transparent auction markets to work.

The Notorious Market-Rigging Ringleader, Goldman Sachs:

Tyler Durden, writing on Zero Hedge, notes that the HFT game is dominated by Goldman Sachs, which he calls “a hedge fund in all but FDIC backing.” Goldman was an investment bank until the fall of 2008, when it became a commercial bank overnight in order to capitalize on federal bailout benefits, including virtually interest-free money from the Fed that it can use to speculate on the opaque ATS exchanges where markets are manipulated and controlled.

Unlike the NYSE, which is open only from 10 am to 4 pm EST daily, ATSs trade around the clock; and they are particularly busy when the NYSE is closed, when stocks are thinly traded and easily manipulated. Tyler Durden writes:

“[A]s the market keeps going up day in and day out, regardless of the deteriorating economic conditions, it is just these HFT’s that determine the overall market direction, usually without fundamental or technical reason. And based on a few lines of code, retail investors get suckered into a rising market that has nothing to do with green shoots or some Chinese firms buying a few hundred extra Intel servers: HFTs are merely perpetuating the same ponzi market mythology last seen in the Madoff case, but on a massively larger scale.”

HFT rigging helps explain how Goldman Sachs earned at least $100 million per day from its trading division, day after day, on 116 out of 194 trading days through the end of September 2009. It’s like taking candy from a baby, when you can see the other players’ cards.

Reviving the Free Market:

So what can be done to restore free and fair markets? A step in the right direction would be to prohibit flash trades. The SEC is proposing such rules, but they haven’t been effected yet.

Another proposed check on HFT is a Tobin tax – a very small tax on every financial trade. Proposals for the tax range from .005% to 1%, so small that it would hardly be felt by legitimate “buy and hold” investors, but high enough to kill HFT, which skims a very tiny profit from a huge number of trades.

That is what proponents contend, but a tiny tax might not actually be enough to kill HFT. Consider Denninger’s example, in which the high-frequency trader was making not just a few pennies but a full 29 cents per trade and had an opportunity to make this sum on 99,500 shares (100,000 shares less 5 100-lot trades at lesser sums). That’s a $28,855 profit on a $2.63 million trade, not bad for a few milliseconds of work. Imposing a .1% Tobin tax on the $2.63 million would reduce the profit to $26,225, but that’s still a nice return for a trade that takes less time than blinking.

The ideal solution would fix the problem at its source -- the price-setting mechanism itself. Keiser says this could be done by banning HFT and installing his VST computer program in its original design in all the exchanges. The true market price would then be established automatically, foreclosing both human and electronic manipulation. He notes that the shareholders of his former firm have a good claim for voiding out the sale to Cantor Fitzgerald and retrieving the program, since the deal was never consummated and the investors in HSX Holdings have never received a penny for the sale.

There is just one problem with their legal claim: the paperwork proving it was shipped to Cantor Fitzgerald’s offices in the World Trade Center several months before September 2001. Like free market capitalism itself, it seems, the evidence has gone up in smoke.

Goldman Sachs E-mails Show Bank Sought To Profit From Housing Downturn:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/24/AR2010042401049.html

By Zachary A. Goldfarb
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 24, 2010; 11:43 AM

A Senate investigation into the financial crisis has found that Goldman Sachs, the storied Wall Street investment bank, sought to profit from the historic decline in housing prices by betting against the U.S. mortgage market.

The documents show that Goldman, at times, made big, profitable bets against the housing market -- sometimes betting against mortgage investments that it had sold to investors.

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, said four internal e-mails released Saturday contradict Goldman's assertion that it didn't seek to profit from the housing downturn. "Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market," Levin said.

In a November 2007 e-mail, Goldman chief executive Lloyd Blankfein wrote that the firm "lost money" on the housing market, "then made more than we lost because of shorts."

The release of the documents comes as Goldman Sachs is preparing its most detailed defense yet to allegations that it misled clients in its mortgage securities business, arguing that the firm was unsure whether housing prices would rise or fall and did not take any action at odds with the interests of its clients.

An internal Goldman document, prepared for senior executives and obtained by The Washington Post, describes debates among top executives in 2006 and 2007 over whether the firm should make investment decisions based on the belief that the mortgage market would continue to prosper.

The document details meetings and e-mails that ultimately resulted in a decision to reduce the company's exposure to the mortgage market, especially subprime loans, by making new investments that would pay off if housing prices fell.

Goldman has been widely criticized for investing its own money to bet against the housing market while simultaneously urging clients to invest in securities that would increase in value only if the housing market did.

Those concerns over possible double-dealing spiked a week ago as the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a fraud suit against Goldman, alleging that it misled clients by selling them mortgage-related securities secretly designed to fail.

The Senate panel will hold a hearing on investment banks and the financial crisis Tuesday. Blankfein and other executives are scheduled to testify.

In one of the e-mails obtained by the committee, Goldman chief financial officer David Viniar responded to a report that the firm earned $50 million in one day with bets that the housing market would decline.

"Tells you what might be happening to people who don't have the big short," Viniar wrote to his colleagues.

In another e-mail, Goldman executives discussed how one subprime mortgage lender the company worked with was facing "wipeout" and another's collapse was "imminent." Goldman helped these lenders bundle and sell their loans to investors.

But one executive, Deeb Salem, wrote, the "good news" was that Goldman would profit $5 million from a bet against the very same bundles of loans it had helped create.

In an October 2007 e-mail, Goldman Sachs mortgage trader Michael Swenson was gleeful at news that credit-rating companies downgraded mortgage-related investments, which caused losses for investors.

"Sounds like we will make some serious money," the executive wrote.

"Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis," Levin said. "They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients."

The e-mails released Saturday portray a different narrative than the one Goldman has given about its role in the mortgage market.

According to Goldman's 11-page defense, while the firm moved to significantly reduce its losses when the housing market cratered, the bank was confused, like many other financial firms, over how bad the collapse would be and suffered losses as a result.

The document also reprises Goldman's frequent explanation that it was not investing its own money in financial transactions to make a trading profit but to help investors who wanted to do a deal and could not easily find someone to trade with. That role, commonly played by investment banks, is known as being a market maker.

In the paper, Goldman argues that it was a relatively small player in the mortgage market, bringing in only $500 million from its residential mortgage business in 2007, less than 1 percent of the firm's overall revenue.

Still, the bank's mortgage investments were large enough that executives began to worry in 2006 that it was betting too heavily on the health of the housing market.

According to the document, the concerns arose in late 2006, when Dan Sparks, the head of the mortgage unit, wrote to top executives that the "subprime market [was] getting hit hard," with the firm losing $20 million in one day.

On Dec. 14, 2006, chief financial officer Viniar called Goldman's mortgage traders and risk managers into a meeting to discuss investing strategy. They concluded that they would reduce the firm's overall exposure to the subprime mortgage market.

But the prevailing view of executives, as described in the paper, was not that the housing market was headed into a prolonged decline. They were not looking to short the market overall. That would have entailed making such large bets against mortgage securities that the firm would turn a profit if the market as a whole collapsed, which in fact it did.

The document acknowledges that Goldman at times shorted the overall market but describes those periods as temporary while the firm was rebalancing its portfolio to limit losses if mortgage securities were to lose more value.

At some moments, executives were actually considering making new bets, buying potentially undervalued securities that could pay off when the mortgage market turned around. A day after Viniar met with traders and risk managers, he wrote to Tom Montan, co-head of the securities division, saying, "There will be very good opportunities as the markets goes into what is likely to be even greater distress and we want to be in position to take advantage of them."

The back-and-forth over which way the market would go, and how to invest in it, continued into 2007.

On March 14, Goldman co-president Jon Winkelried e-mailed Sparks and others asking what the bank was doing to protect itself from a decline in prices of not just subprime loans, but also other loans traditionally considered less risky. Sparks replied that the firm was trying to have "smaller" exposure to those loans also.

But managing director Richard Ruzika took issue with that answer a few days later, saying that Goldman might be overestimating the decline in housing. "It does feel to me like the market in general underestimated how bad it could get. And now could be overestimating where we are heading," he wrote in an e-mail. "While undoubtedly there will be some continued spillover, I'm not so convinced this is a total death spiral. In fact, we may have terrific opportunities."

Sparks later endorsed that optimistic view, suggesting as late as August 2007 that Goldman begin buying more mortgage securities.

The bank did not immediately follow that path, and by Nov. 30, 2007, Goldman had largely canceled out its exposure to subprime mortgages by increasing its bets that the market would continue to slide, according to the document.

But by that account, Goldman also continued to have $13.5 billion in exposure to safer, prime mortgages. That cost the bank. In 2008, the firm lost $1.7 billion on investments in residential mortgages.

On Goldman, Securities Fraud, And Skepticism:

http://market-ticker.org/archives/2214-On-Goldman,-Securities-Fraud,-And-Skepticism.html

By now of course you know that Goldman Sachs was charged by the SEC with civil securities fraud Friday - unless you live under a rock.

The weekend has brought forth several interesting points, all of which I believe our political (and bankster) class had better pay attention to. In no particular order:

The rest of the world is tired of this crap too. Britain and Germany, to name two, are now looking at going after Goldman. This will not end here by any stretch of the imagination.

Goldman may have violated more than one law. Isn't receipt of a Wells Notice a "material event" that requires disclosure via an 8-K filing? I'm sure they'll claim "no", but I wouldn't be so sure of that. Never mind their hasty response on Friday afternoon. We'll see how this plays out.

Goldman was not the only large bank involved in deceptive deals. We should really talk about Magnetar, shouldn't we, and the nine banks that enabled their piece of this (that would be Merrill, Citi, UBS and more.) They were all involved in a number of deals that smell suspiciously like the one the SEC went after Goldman over. Or shall we talk about Jefferson County, Alabama again? You know, where JP Morgan was involved in a deal to "help" the county replace its aging sewer system, and wound up costing them 25 times the original (and actual) price of the work? Oh, and let's not forget that several government officials and private-sector folks have gone to prison already for their involvement in this scandal - for bribery and related acts, while not one indictment has issued against a bank executive or the banks involved themselves.

Jamie Dimon is threatening governments (again), this time in Germany. The people have had quite enough of extortion and blackmail, Mr. Dimon. You might also want to consider that some of those "less-regulated" markets you might flee to, such as China, have a habit of solving regulatory problems not with indictments and juries but rather with summary imprisonment or even execution. Consider the folks in the "basic materials" business who allegedly got caught gaming the system in China recently - and were summarily tried and convicted. Others have simply been shot. We claim to be more civilized here in this country, which is one of the reasons your threat rings rather hollow - in those "unregulated" markets you're more likely to find a disgruntled investor wields an AK-47 rather than a summons or subpoena, and you know it. I double-dog-dare you to take your capital and move to any of those places - I'll be watching for the Youtube of your execution when you screw someone over in East Buoffo as a consequence of their "unregulated market", and promise to chortle when it is posted.

The people don't believe the SEC, Congress or the Obama administration. Bill Clinton is now saying he took "wrong advice" from Larry Summers and Bob Rubin. That "advice" included Gramm-Leach-Bliley, I might add, as well as derivatives. Let the record show that Larry Summers took a clean shot at bankrupting Harvard University, losing $14 billion of its endowment in just over a year's time. I'm sure some of that has come back with the stock market "recovery" (engineered via more phony accounting) but the fact remains that as Harvard's Corporation (in the legal sense) consists of seven members who are accountable to nobody but themselves. Bob Rubin, for his part, was entangled in Citi at the time of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act's passage. Oh, and Rubin is on Harvard's board.

The people have every right to be skeptical. Indeed, perhaps cynicism is more appropriate than skepticism in this case, in that every step of the last ten years when it comes to financial firms and regulation appears to have been driven by one goal: to allow banksters and their cronies to loot and pillage the American people, who are then supposed to back them up when their fancy games go awry.

I'm tired of it - but I was tired of it back in 1998, 1999, 2000 and onward when I saw the pernicious and outrageous frauds being perpetrated against investors in so-called "new economy" businesses. Nearly all of them went bankrupt in the .COM crash. The simple fact of the matter is that almost none of these firms had any business going public in the first place - they were the starry-eyed dreams of some pimply kid barely out of business school (and sometimes not even that well-versed in the real world) backed by a private-equity or "angel" investor who knew how to game the system and pay off the investment banks via lots of fee-based business to issue "strong buys" on worthless securities.

As just one example I put forward the DSL providers of the day - Covad, Rythms and Northpoint. I talked with all three. All three presented me with a business model for "partnering" with them. A bit of quick math led me to the inescapable conclusion that they didn't have a prayer in hell of ever being profitable on an operating basis, say much less covering equipment depreciation and amortization. I passed on getting involved with any of them for that reason and all three later blew up, vindicating what was in fact a fairly simple set of calculations. So how did the investment banks and others who brought those firms public, all of whom clearly had at least as powerful a calculator as I did, justify their IPOs?

Virtually everyone got screwed by these games, not the least of which were the honest companies. IPOs that doubled on the first day were seen as a strong endorsement of the company instead of what they really were, which is a rip-off of the firm who left literal millions, and sometimes hundreds of millions, on the table to be stolen by the investment banks who exercised their "overallotments" and then sold into the first-day ramps. The underwriting institutions didn't give a damn if there was a sustainable business behind the S-1, so long as that first-day ramp job materialized and they could both earn their fee and the override on the over-allotment - the second often being multiples of the first.

The game never changed in the 2000s - this time we had banks scamming people on the value of so-called "AAA" mortgages and the constructs put together both out of them and referenced off them. Again the securities were worthless or nearly so, but the banks didn't care so long as they got their fees. And like the last time, they basked in the knowledge that they both would not wind up on the wrong end of an indictment and that if things got really bad (as they did this time) they could shove a gun up your nose and force you, the taxpayer, to bail them out.

The important point behind both of these tales is that without the fraudulent securities being issued NEITHER BUBBLE WOULD HAVE INFLATED. That is, neither was simply an "accident" or "starry-eyed dreamers" that got in over their heads. Both bubbles were INTENTIONAL scams fueled by Wall Street's seemingly-unending ability to package up trash and sell it while extracting their fees and "overrides". They then feign ignorance when what THEY KNEW was dead fish starts stinking up the place.

THIS MUST STOP and all the pretending won't do it. Nor will claims that we're writing "euthanasia" bills "for the future." The fact of the matter is that all of these institutions are and have been exercising privileges - the privilege to issue credit on the sovereign wealth of the United States.

That privilege is not the government's to bestow, it is we the people's, and we must withdraw that consent until the scamming is stopped by force of law.

Federally-guaranteed deposit-taking and transaction clearing is a ministerial function. To a large extent so should be lending with guaranteed funds, which I have repeatedly argued should devolve down into "One Dollar Of Capital." Return home mortgages to a 28/36 ratio set and 20% down for all federally-guaranteed loans, and all held or originated by any depository or otherwise-insured institution (including those with access to Fed facilities.)

If people want to gamble - that is, take risk of any sort - let them do it with their own capital but never with the taxpayer's. This means full reinstatement of Glass-Steagall and everything that comes with it. If Jamie Dimon and others don't like these rules then let them take their capital to some other country that doesn't mind having its economy detonated every five to seven years by these scoundrels.

Someone else will take his place and provide the necessary functions; a safe and solid 7-8% return isn't bad, after all, especially when it's government-guaranteed!

Our government and both political parties are severely miscalculating if they believe the anger in society right now is going to let this pass without real reform - not the cock-and-bull games being played by both sides of the aisle at present.

Faux "charges" and SEC "bluster and thunder" are not indictments. We have plenty of information not only in the public record but now irrefutably in the hands of Congress, such as the WaMu disaster, for lawmakers to demand both that existing laws against fraud be enforced and that these institutions all be broken up right here and now, today, with every dollar they stole (that still exists anyway) being clawed back.

There is even hard evidence that members of our government, in some cases, conspired with institutions to falsify accounting (e.g. IndyMac and backdated deposits), a toxic brew of corruption that threatens the vital trust between government and people on which civil order and stability rest.

The people will not sit for less than full enforcement of existing law, restitution for these acts and a reinstatement of Glass-Steagall's proscriptions. Over eight millions jobs were lost in this crash and more than five million additional people failed to find employment during the last so-called "recovery" as they entered the workforce. Even more Americans had their jobs shipped overseas and had their hands (and sometimes head) stepped on as they tried to climb the income ladder. The anger seething under the surface of society is not only palatable it is getting much worse by the day. I overhear conversations almost every time I'm out in public now and most of them are absolutely unsuitable for polite company. This is a marked change from last year as the hope of Obama's election has turned to the anger of recognition, even among Democrats, that we were conned - again.

The people are not talking about which brand of Girl Scout cookie to buy - that much I will assure you, and I'm talking about conversations overheard in the local supermarket - not exactly where you expect to find "nutjobs" of any persuasion talking about various things one doesn't usually think, say much less speak of openly. I shudder at the thought of what's being said behind closed doors where folks like me, who have and continue to preach working within the law, have never been and never will be invited.

How much longer can government get away with the games before something - or someone - snaps? I don't have the foggiest clue, but Friday proved that the stock market hasn't been rising as a consequence of an improving economy but rather on the belief by a handful of speculators that the looting and pillaging that was given free rein and license last spring when FASB was forced to change the accounting rules would not only be allowed to continue but would intensify.

The problem with this philosophy and course of action is that the American People in the main are literally being bled dry by the vampires on Wall Street. The most dangerous man of all is one who has lost everything - home, job, family - and thus has nothing left to lose.

Irrespective of the "pumpers" on Wall Street and in The Media the facts on the ground do not reflect the optimism - consumer "spending" has been held up by people not paying their mortgages, long-term unemployment has ravaged our states and communities while government has simply handed out more and more money via extensions of this and that program, papering over the rot in the economy with borrowed funds we cannot afford.

Government must step in and break these behemoths up. Not because they're too big to fail tomorrow, but because they did too much damage this time around and must not be allowed to get away with it, say much less prosper as a consequence. These acts were not errors of judgment or accidents they were willful and intentional actions taken with full knowledge of the consequences.

Bluntly, these banksters looted the public worldwide through two full cycles of boom and bust, they did it intentionally, and our nation cannot withstand another one of their attacks.

Those of you in Washington DC and State Governments who are reading this, get away from your insular world inside the beltway and state houses and meet with constituents - not as a Representative or Senator, but as an ordinary Joe. Leave the armed goon squad behind and drive a chevy to the local eatery, your local store, the coffee shop or WalMart in your town. Shut your yap for a week and just listen. Note the marked deterioration in mood, attitude and words you hear. That's real, it's dangerous, and you can only deal with it one way - by putting a stop to the looting and start with the prosecuting.

The people are pissed and they're not going to sit still for this. You will either stop it, right here and now, or you will lose your jobs. If you try to lie your way out of it as you have for the last decade you are taking a horrible risk, as this nation and indeed the world is a tinderbox, and little would be required to set off civil unrest or, far worse - war.

Remember, it wasn't just Americans that got screwed and are pissed off.

Do the right thing while there is still time.

John Paulson Needs A Good Lawyer:

Written by Simon Johnson
April 18, 2010 at 9:00 am

http://baselinescenario.com/2010/04/18/john-paulson-needs-a-good-lawyer/#more-7214

Of all the reactions so far to various dimensions of Goldman fraudulent securities “Fab” scandal, one stands out. On Bill Maher’s show, Friday night, I argued that John Paulson – the investor who helped design the CDO at the heart of the affair – should face serious legal consequences.

On the show, David Remnick of the New Yorker pointed out that Paulson has not been indicted. And since then numerous people have argued that Paulson did nothing wrong – rather that the fault purely lies with Goldman for not disclosing fully to investors who had designed the CDO.

But this is to mistake the nature of the crime here – and also to misread the legal strategy of the SEC.

The obvious targets are Goldman’s top executives, whom we know were deeply engaged with the housing side of their business in early 2007 – because it was an important part of their book and they were well aware that the market was in general going bad.

Either Goldman’s executives were well aware of the “Fab” and its implications – in which case they face serious potential criminal and civil penalties – or they did not have effective control over transactions that posed significant operational and financial risk to their organization.

They will undoubtedly pursue the “we did not know” defense – which of course debunks entirely the position taken by Gerry Corrigan (of Goldman and formerly head of the NY Fed) when I pressed him before the Senate Banking Committee in February. Corrigan claimed that Goldman’s risk management system is the best in the business and simply superb; the former may be true, but the latter claim will be blown up by Lloyd Blankfein’s own lawyers – they must, in order to keep him out of jail. (Aside to Mr. Blankfein’s lawyers: the people you are up against have already read 13 Bankers and may put it to good use; you might want to get a copy.)

And don’t be misled by the purely civil nature of the charges so far – and the fact that the announced target is only one transaction. This is a good strategy to uncover more information – for broader charges on related dimensions – and it allows congressional enquiries to pile on more freely.

As for John Paulson, the issue will of course be the “paper trail” – including emails and phone conversations. A great deal of pressure will be brought to bear on the people who have worked with him, many of whom now faced permanently broken careers in any case.

Here’s the legal theory to keep in mind. Mr. Paulson only stood to gain on a massive scale (or at all) if the securities in question were mispriced, i.e., because their true nature (that they had been picked by Mr. Paulson) was not disclosed. In other words, the Paulson transactions at this stage of the game only made sense if they involved fraud. The principals involved (Paulson and top Goldman people) are all super smart, with unmatched practical experience in this area; they get this totally.

John Paulson was not the trigger man – it was Goldman and its executives who withheld adverse material information from their customers. But if the entire scheme was Mr. Paulson’s idea – if he was in any legal sense the mastermind (obviously he was, but can you prove it beyond a reasonable doubt?) – then we are looking at potential conspiracy to commit fraud. And if he had conversations of any kind and at any time during this period with top Goldman executives, this will become even more interesting - so of course all relevant phone records will now be subpoenaed.

Mr. Paulson should be banned from securities markets for life. If that is not possible under current rules and regulations, those should be changed so they can apply. If that change requires an Act of Congress, so be it.

There is fraud at the heart of Wall Street. It is time to end that.

SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages:

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm

Washington, D.C., April 16, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman, Sachs & Co. and one of its vice presidents for defrauding investors by misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter.



The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Goldman Sachs failed to disclose to investors vital information about the CDO, in particular the role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

"The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement. "Goldman wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence which mortgage securities to include in an investment portfolio, while telling other investors that the securities were selected by an independent, objective third party."

Kenneth Lench, Chief of the SEC's Structured and New Products Unit, added, "The SEC continues to investigate the practices of investment banks and others involved in the securitization of complex financial products tied to the U.S. housing market as it was beginning to show signs of distress."

The SEC alleges that one of the world's largest hedge funds, Paulson & Co., paid Goldman Sachs to structure a transaction in which Paulson & Co. could take short positions against mortgage securities chosen by Paulson & Co. based on a belief that the securities would experience credit events.

According to the SEC's complaint, filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the marketing materials for the CDO known as ABACUS 2007-AC1 (ABACUS) all represented that the RMBS portfolio underlying the CDO was selected by ACA Management LLC (ACA), a third party with expertise in analyzing credit risk in RMBS. The SEC alleges that undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, the Paulson & Co. hedge fund, which was poised to benefit if the RMBS defaulted, played a significant role in selecting which RMBS should make up the portfolio.

The SEC's complaint alleges that after participating in the portfolio selection, Paulson & Co. effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (CDS) with Goldman Sachs to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS capital structure. Given that financial short interest, Paulson & Co. had an economic incentive to select RMBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near future. Goldman Sachs did not disclose Paulson & Co.'s short position or its role in the collateral selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum, or other marketing materials provided to investors.

The SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs Vice President Fabrice Tourre was principally responsible for ABACUS 2007-AC1. Tourre structured the transaction, prepared the marketing materials, and communicated directly with investors. Tourre allegedly knew of Paulson & Co.'s undisclosed short interest and role in the collateral selection process. In addition, he misled ACA into believing that Paulson & Co. invested approximately $200 million in the equity of ABACUS, indicating that Paulson & Co.'s interests in the collateral selection process were closely aligned with ACA's interests. In reality, however, their interests were sharply conflicting.

According to the SEC's complaint, the deal closed on April 26, 2007, and Paulson & Co. paid Goldman Sachs approximately $15 million for structuring and marketing ABACUS. By Oct. 24, 2007, 83 percent of the RMBS in the ABACUS portfolio had been downgraded and 17 percent were on negative watch. By Jan. 29, 2008, 99 percent of the portfolio had been downgraded.

Investors in the liabilities of ABACUS are alleged to have lost more than $1 billion.

The SEC's complaint charges Goldman Sachs and Tourre with violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. The Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest, and financial penalties.

For more information about this enforcement action, contact:

Lorin L. Reisner
Deputy Director, SEC Enforcement Division
(202) 551-4787

Kenneth R. Lench
Chief, Structured and New Products Unit, SEC Enforcement Division
(202) 551-4938

Reid A. Muoio
Deputy Chief, Structured and New Products Unit, SEC Enforcement Division
(202) 551-4488

As you can see, shares of GS are down over 13% today. The first chart is a one day chart of today's action, and the second chart is a daily chart that shows how serious the $24.00 drop in share price really is:

Looting Main Street:

How the nation's biggest banks are ripping off American cities with the same predatory deals that brought down Greece...

By Matt Taibbi
Posted Mar 31, 2010 8:15 AM



If you want to know what life in the Third World is like, just ask Lisa Pack, an administrative assistant who works in the roads and transportation department in Jefferson County, Alabama. Pack got rudely introduced to life in post-crisis America last August, when word came down that she and 1,000 of her fellow public employees would have to take a little unpaid vacation for a while. The county, it turned out, was more than $5 billion in debt — meaning that courthouses, jails and sheriff's precincts had to be closed so that Wall Street banks could be paid.

As public services in and around Birmingham were stripped to the bone, Pack struggled to support her family on a weekly unemployment check of $260. Nearly a fourth of that went to pay for her health insurance, which the county no longer covered. She also fielded calls from laid-off co-workers who had it even tougher. "I'd be on the phone sometimes until two in the morning," she says. "I had to talk more than one person out of suicide. For some of the men supporting families, it was so hard — foreclosure, bankruptcy. I'd go to bed at night, and I'd be in tears."

Homes stood empty, businesses were boarded up, and parts of already-blighted Birmingham began to take on the feel of a ghost town. There were also a few bills that were unique to the area — like the $64 sewer bill that Pack and her family paid each month. "Yeah, it went up about 400 percent just over the past few years," she says.

The sewer bill, in fact, is what cost Pack and her co-workers their jobs. In 1996, the average monthly sewer bill for a family of four in Birmingham was only $14.71 — but that was before the county decided to build an elaborate new sewer system with the help of out-of-state financial wizards with names like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase. The result was a monstrous pile of borrowed money that the county used to build, in essence, the world's grandest toilet — "the Taj Mahal of sewer-treatment plants" is how one county worker put it. What happened here in Jefferson County would turn out to be the perfect metaphor for the peculiar alchemy of modern oligarchical capitalism: A mob of corrupt local officials and morally absent financiers got together to build a giant device that converted human waste into billions of dollars of profit for Wall Street — and misery for people like Lisa Pack.

And once the giant machine was built and the note on all that fancy construction started to come due, Wall Street came back to the local politicians and doubled down on the scam. They showed up in droves to help the poor, broke citizens of Jefferson County cut their toilet finance charges using a blizzard of incomprehensible swaps and refinance schemes — schemes that only served to postpone the repayment date a year or two while sinking the county deeper into debt. In the end, every time Jefferson County so much as breathed near one of the banks, it got charged millions in fees. There was so much money to be made bilking these dizzy Southerners that banks like JP Morgan spent millions paying middlemen who bribed — yes, that's right, bribed, criminally bribed — the county commissioners and their buddies just to keep their business. Hell, the money was so good, JP Morgan at one point even paid Goldman Sachs $3 million just to back off, so they could have the rubes of Jefferson County to fleece all for themselves.

Birmingham became the poster child for a new kind of giant-scale financial fraud, one that would threaten the financial stability not only of cities and counties all across America, but even those of entire countries like Greece. While for many Americans the financial crisis remains an abstraction, a confusing mess of complex transactions that took place on a cloud high above Manhattan sometime in the mid-2000s, in Jefferson County you can actually see the rank criminality of the crisis economy with your own eyes; the monster sticks his head all the way out of the water. Here you can see a trail that leads directly from a billion-dollar predatory swap deal cooked up at the highest levels of America's biggest banks, across a vast fruited plain of bribes and felonies — "the price of doing business," as one JP Morgan banker says on tape — all the way down to Lisa Pack's sewer bill and the mass layoffs in Birmingham.

Once you follow that trail and understand what took place in Jefferson County, there's really no room left for illusions. We live in a gangster state, and our days of laughing at other countries are over. It's our turn to get laughed at. In Birmingham, lots of people have gone to jail for the crime: More than 20 local officials and businessmen have been convicted of corruption in federal court. Last October, right around the time that Lisa Pack went back to work at reduced hours, Birmingham's mayor was convicted of fraud and money-laundering for taking bribes funneled to him by Wall Street bankers — everything from Rolex watches to Ferragamo suits to cash. But those who greenlighted the bribes and profited most from the scam remain largely untouched. "It never gets back to JP Morgan," says Pack.

If you want to get all Glenn Beck about it, you could lay the blame for this entire mess at the feet of weepy, tree-hugging environmentalists. It all started with the Cahaba River, the longest free-flowing river in the state of Alabama. The tributary, which winds its way through Birmingham before turning diagonally to empty out near Selma, is home to more types of fish per mile than any other river in America and shelters 64 rare and imperiled species of plants and animals. It's also the source of one of the worst municipal financial disasters in American history.

Back in the early 1990s, the county's sewer system was so antiquated that it was leaking raw sewage directly into the Cahaba, which also supplies the area with its drinking water. Joined by well — intentioned citizens from the Cahaba River Society, the EPA sued the county to force it to comply with the Clean Water Act. In 1996, county commissioners signed a now-infamous consent decree agreeing not just to fix the leaky pipes but to eliminate all sewer overflows — a near-impossible standard that required the county to build the most elaborate, ecofriendly, expensive sewer system in the history of the universe. It was like ordering a small town in Florida that gets a snowstorm once every five years to build a billion-dollar fleet of snowplows.

The original cost estimates for the new sewer system were as low as $250 million. But in a wondrous demonstration of the possibilities of small-town graft and contract-padding, the price tag quickly swelled to more than $3 billion. County commissioners were literally pocketing wads of cash from builders and engineers and other contractors eager to get in on the project, while the county was forced to borrow obscene sums to pay for the rapidly spiraling costs. Jefferson County, in effect, became one giant, TV-stealing, unemployed drug addict who borrowed a million dollars to buy the mother of all McMansions — and just as it did during the housing bubble, Wall Street made a business of keeping the crook in his house. As one county commissioner put it, "We're like a guy making $50,000 a year with a million-dollar mortgage."

To reassure lenders that the county would pay its mortgage, commissioners gave the finance director — an unelected official appointed by the president of the commission — the power to automatically raise sewer rates to meet payments on the debt. The move brought in billions in financing, but it also painted commissioners into a corner. If costs continued to rise — and with practically every contractor in Alabama sticking his fingers on the scale, they were rising fast — officials would be faced with automatic rate increases that would piss off their voters. (By 2003, annual interest on the sewer deal had reached $90 million.) So the commission reached out to Wall Street, looking for creative financing tools that would allow it to reduce the county's staggering debt payments.

Wall Street was happy to help. First, it employed the same trick it used to fuel the housing crisis: It switched the county from a fixed rate on the bonds it had issued to finance the sewer deal to an adjustable rate. The refinancing meant lower interest payments for a couple of years — followed by the risk of even larger payments down the road. The move enabled county commissioners to postpone the problem for an election season or two, kicking it to a group of future commissioners who would inevitably have to pay the real freight.

But then Wall Street got really creative. Having switched the county to a variable interest rate, it offered commissioners a crazy deal: For an extra fee, the banks said, we'll allow you to keep paying a fixed rate on your debt to us. In return, we'll give you a variable amount each month that you can use to pay off all that variable-rate interest you owe to bondholders.

In financial terms, this is known as a synthetic rate swap — the spidery creature you might have read about playing a role in bringing down places like Greece and Milan. On paper, it made sense: The county got the stability of a fixed rate, while paying Wall Street to assume the risk of the variable rates on its bonds. That's the synthetic part. The trouble lies in the rate swap. The deal only works if the two variable rates — the one you get from the bank, and the one you owe to bondholders — actually match. It's like gambling on the weather. If your bondholders are expecting you to pay an interest rate based on the average temperature in Alabama, you don't do a rate swap with a bank that gives you back a rate pegged to the temperature in Nome, Alaska.

Not unless you're a moron. Or your banker is JP Morgan.

In a small office in a federal building in downtown Birmingham, just blocks from where civil rights demonstrators shut down the city in 1963, Assistant U.S. Attorney George Martin points out the window. He's pointing in the direction of the Tutwiler Hotel, once home to one of the grandest ballrooms in the South but now part of the Hampton Inn chain.

"It was right around the corner here, at the hotel," Martin says. "That's where they met — that's where this all started."

They means Charles LeCroy and Bill Blount, the two principals in what would become the most important of all the corruption cases in Jefferson County. LeCroy was a banker for JP Morgan, serving as managing director of the bank's southeast regional office. Blount was an Alabama wheeler-dealer with close friends on the county commission. For years, when Wall Street banks wanted to do business with municipalities, whether for bond issues or rate swaps, it was standard practice to reach out to a local sleazeball like Blount and pay him a ton of money to help seal the deal. "Banks would pay some local consultant, and the consultant would then funnel money to the politician making the decision," says Christopher Taylor, the former head of the board that regulates municipal borrowing. Back in the 1990s, Taylor pushed through a ban on such backdoor bribery. He also passed a ban on bankers contributing directly to politicians they do business with — a move that sparked a lawsuit by one aggrieved sleazeball, who argued that halting such legalized graft violated his First Amendment rights. The name of that pissed-off banker? "It was the one and only Bill Blount," Taylor says with a laugh.

Blount is a stocky, stubby-fingered Southerner with glasses and a pale, pinched face — if Norman Rockwell had ever done a painting titled "Small-Town Accountant Taking Enormous Dump," it would look just like Blount. LeCroy, his sugar daddy at JP Morgan, is a tall, bloodless, crisply dressed corporate operator with a shiny bald head and silver side patches — a cross between Skeletor and Michael Stipe.

The scheme they operated went something like this: LeCroy paid Blount millions of dollars, and Blount turned around and used the money to buy lavish gifts for his close friend Larry Langford, the now-convicted Birmingham mayor who at the time had just been elected president of the county commission. (At one point Blount took Langford on a shopping spree in New York, putting $3,290 worth of clothes from Zegna on his credit card.) Langford then signed off on one after another of the deadly swap deals being pushed by LeCroy. Every time the county refinanced its sewer debt, JP Morgan made millions of dollars in fees. Even more lucrative, each of the swap contracts contained clauses that mandated all sorts of penalties and payments in the event that something went wrong with the deal. In the mortgage business, this process is known as churning: You keep coming back over and over to refinance, and they keep "churning" you for more and more fees. "The transactions were complex, but the scheme was simple," said Robert Khuzami, director of enforcement for the SEC. "Senior JP Morgan bankers made unlawful payments to win business and earn fees."

Given the huge amount of money to be made on the refinancing deals, JP Morgan was prepared to pay whatever it took to buy off officials in Jefferson County. In 2002, during a conversation recorded in Nixonian fashion by JP Morgan itself, LeCroy bragged that he had agreed to funnel payoff money to a pair of local companies to secure the votes of two county commissioners. "Look," the commissioners told him, "if we support the synthetic refunding, you guys have to take care of our two firms." LeCroy didn't blink. "Whatever you want," he told them. "If that's what you need, that's what you get. Just tell us how much."

Just tell us how much. That sums up the approach that JP Morgan took a few months later, when Langford announced that his good buddy Bill Blount would henceforth be involved with every financing transaction for Jefferson County. From JP Morgan's point of view, the decision to pay off Blount was a no-brainer. But the bank had one small problem: Goldman Sachs had already crawled up Blount's trouser leg, and the broker was advising Langford to pick them as Jefferson County's investment bank.

The solution they came up with was an extraordinary one: JP Morgan cut a separate deal with Goldman, paying the bank $3 million to back off, with Blount taking a $300,000 cut of the side deal. Suddenly Goldman was out and JP Morgan was sitting in Langford's lap. In another conversation caught on tape, LeCroy joked that the deal was his "philanthropic work," since the payoff amounted to a "charitable donation to Goldman Sachs" in return for "taking no risk."

That such a blatant violation of anti-trust laws took place and neither JP Morgan nor Goldman have been prosecuted for it is yet another mystery of the current financial crisis. "This is an open-and-shut case of anti-competitive behavior," says Taylor, the former regulator.

With Goldman out of the way, JP Morgan won the right to do a $1.1 billion bond offering — switching Jefferson County out of fixed-rate debt into variable-rate debt — and also did a corresponding $1.1 billion deal for a synthetic rate swap. The very same day the transaction was concluded, in May 2003, LeCroy had dinner with Langford and struck a deal to do yet another bond-and-swap transaction of roughly the same size. This time, the terms of the payoff were spelled out more explicitly. In a hilarious phone call between LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin, another JP Morgan official, the two bankers groaned aloud about how much it was going to cost to satisfy Blount:

LeCroy: I said, "Commissioner Langford, I'll do that because that's your suggestion, but you gotta help us keep him under control. Because when you give that guy a hand, he takes your arm." You know?

MacFaddin: [Laughing] Yeah, you end up in the wood-chipper.

All told, JP Morgan ended up paying Blount nearly $3 million for "performing no known services," in the words of the SEC. In at least one of the deals, Blount made upward of 15 percent of JP Morgan's entire fee. When I ask Taylor what a legitimate consultant might earn in such a circumstance, he laughs. "What's a 'legitimate consultant' in a case like this? He made this money for doing nothing."

As the tapes of LeCroy's calls show, even officials at JP Morgan were incredulous at the money being funneled to Blount. "How does he get 15 percent?" one associate at the bank asks LeCroy. "For doing what? For not messing with us?"

"Not messing with us," LeCroy agrees. "It's a lot of money, but in the end, it's worth it on a billion-dollar deal."

That's putting it mildly: The deals wound up being the largest swap agreements in JP Morgan's history. Making matters worse, the payoffs didn't even wind up costing the bank a dime. As the SEC explained in a statement on the scam, JP Morgan "passed on the cost of the unlawful payments by charging the county higher interest rates on the swap transactions." In other words, not only did the bank bribe local politicians to take the sucky deal, they got local taxpayers to pay for the bribes. And because Jefferson County had no idea what kind of deal it was getting on the swaps, JP Morgan could basically charge whatever it wanted. According to an analysis of the swap deals commissioned by the county in 2007, taxpayers had been overcharged at least $93 million on the transactions.

JP Morgan was far from alone in the scam: Virtually everyone doing business in Jefferson County was on the take. Four of the nation's top investment banks, the very cream of American finance, were involved in one way or another with payoffs to Blount in their scramble to do business with the county. In addition to JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns paid Langford's bagman $2.4 million, while Lehman Brothers got off cheap with a $35,000 "arranger's fee." At least a dozen of the county's contractors were also cashing in, along with many of the county commissioners. "If you go into the county courthouse," says Michael Morrison, a planner who works for the county, "there's a gallery of past commissioners on the wall. On the top row, every single one of 'em but two has been investigated, indicted or convicted. It's a joke."

The crazy thing is that such arrangements — where some local scoundrel gets a massive fee for doing nothing but greasing the wheels with elected officials — have been taking place all over the country. In Illinois, during the Upper Volta-esque era of Rod Blagojevich, a Republican political consultant named Robert Kjellander got 10 percent of the entire fee Bear Stearns earned doing a bond sale for the state pension fund. At the start of Obama's term, Bill Richardson's Cabinet appointment was derailed for a similar scheme when he was governor of New Mexico. Indeed, one reason that officials in Jefferson County didn't know that the swaps they were signing off on were lousy was because their adviser on the deals was a firm called CDR Financial Products, which is now accused of conspiring to overcharge dozens of cities in swap transactions. According to a federal antitrust lawsuit, CDR is basically a big-league version of Bill Blount — banks tossed money at the firm, which in turn advised local politicians that they were getting a good deal. "It was basically, you pay CDR, and CDR helps push the deal through," says Taylor.

In the end, though, all this bribery and graft was just the table-setter for the real disaster. In taking all those bribes and signing on to all those swaps, the commissioners in Jefferson County had basically started the clock on a financial time bomb that, sooner or later, had to explode. By continually refinancing to keep the county in its giant McMansion, the commission had managed to push into the future that inevitable day when the real bill would arrive in the mail. But that's where the mortgage analogy ends — because in one key area, a swap deal differs from a home mortgage. Imagine a mortgage that you have to keep on paying even after you sell your house. That's basically how a swap deal works. And Jefferson County had done 23 of them. At one point, they had more outstanding swaps than New York City.

Judgment Day was coming — just like it was for the Delaware River Port Authority, the Pennsylvania school system, the cities of Detroit, Chicago, Oakland and Los Angeles, the states of Connecticut and Mississippi, the city of Milan and nearly 500 other municipalities in Italy, the country of Greece, and God knows who else. All of these places are now reeling under the weight of similarly elaborate and ill-advised swaps — and if what happened in Jefferson County is any guide, hoo boy. Because when the shit hit the fan in Birmingham, it really hit the fan.

For Jefferson County, the deal blew up in early 2008, when a dizzying array of penalties and other fine-print poison worked into the swap contracts started to kick in. The trouble began with the housing crash, which took down the insurance companies that had underwritten the county's bonds. That rendered the county's insurance worthless, triggering clauses in its swap contracts that required it to pay off more than $800 million of its debt in only four years, rather than 40. That, in turn, scared off private lenders, who were no longer interested in bidding on the county's bonds. The banks were forced to make up the difference — a service for which they charged enormous penalties. It was as if the county had missed a payment on its credit card and woke up the next morning to find its annual percentage rate jacked up to a million percent. Between 2008 and 2009, the annual payment on Jefferson County's debt jumped from $53 million to a whopping $636 million.

It gets worse. Remember the swap deal that Jefferson County did with JP Morgan, how the variable rates it got from the bank were supposed to match those it owed its bondholders? Well, they didn't. Most of the payments the county was receiving from JP Morgan were based on one set of interest rates (the London Interbank Exchange Rate), while the payments it owed to its bondholders followed a different set of rates (a municipal-bond index). Jefferson County was suddenly getting far less from JP Morgan, and owing tons more to bondholders. In other words, the bank and Bill Blount made tens of millions of dollars selling deals to local politicians that were not only completely defective, but blew the entire county to smithereens.

And here's the kicker. Last year, when Jefferson County, staggered by the weight of its penalties, was unable to make its swap payments to JP Morgan, the bank canceled the deal. That triggered one-time "termination fees" of — yes, you read this right — $647 million. That was money the county would owe no matter what happened with the rest of its debt, even if bondholders decided to forgive and forget every dime the county had borrowed. It was like the herpes simplex of loans — debt that does not go away, ever, for as long as you live. On a sewer project that was originally supposed to cost $250 million, the county now owed a total of $1.28 billion just in interest and fees on the debt. Imagine paying $250,000 a year on a car you purchased for $50,000, and that's roughly where Jefferson County stood at the end of last year.

Last November, the SEC charged JP Morgan with fraud and canceled the $647 million in termination fees. The bank agreed to pay a $25 million fine and fork over $50 million to assist displaced workers in Jefferson County. So far, the county has managed to avoid bankruptcy, but the sewer fiasco had downgraded its credit rating, triggering payments on other outstanding loans and pushing Birmingham toward the status of an African debtor state. For the next generation, the county will be in a constant fight to collect enough taxes just to pay off its debt, which now totals $4,800 per resident.

The city of Birmingham was founded in 1871, at the dawn of the Southern industrial boom, for the express purpose of attracting Northern capital — it was even named after a famous British steel town to burnish its entrepreneurial cred. There's a gruesome irony in it now lying sacked and looted by financial vandals from the North. The destruction of Jefferson County reveals the basic battle plan of these modern barbarians, the way that banks like JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs have systematically set out to pillage towns and cities from Pittsburgh to Athens. These guys aren't number-crunching whizzes making smart investments; what they do is find suckers in some municipal-finance department, corner them in complex lose-lose deals and flay them alive.

In a complete subversion of free-market principles, they take no risk, score deals based on political influence rather than competition, keep consumers in the dark — and walk away with big money. "It's not high finance," says Taylor, the former bond regulator. "It's low finance." And even if the regulators manage to catch up with them billions of dollars later, the banks just pay a small fine and move on to the next scam. This isn't capitalism. It's nomadic thievery.

[From Issue 1102 — April 15, 2010]

http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/32906678/looting_main_street